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Can we predict when and where violence will likely break out within cases of genocide? I present a
theoretical model to help identify areas susceptible and resistant to violence during genocide. The model
conceptualizes violence onset as a function of elite competition for control of the state from above and the
ethnic segregation of society from below. First, in areas where extremist elite control is weak, violence is
delayed or averted because a contest for control between pro-violence elites and anti-violence moderates
arises and the competition takes time to resolve. Where control is strong, violence is immediate or early
because extremists face little competition and can rapidly deploy the state's coercive resources against
targeted groups. Second, in areas where the integration of ethnic groups is high, violence is delayed
because it takes time to break existing interethnic bonds and destroy bridging social capital. Cohesive
communities resist elite attempts to divide them through interethnic trust and cooperation. I test the
model by examining sub-national variation in genocide onset across Rwanda's 145 communes using new
data and duration analysis. I additionally explore causal mechanisms by within-case analyses comparing
early and late onset in two communes. The ﬁndings have implications for international policy makers as
they respond to genocides and strategically prioritize limited intervention resources.
© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).Within cases of genocide, can we predict when and where
violence is likely to break out? State-organized violence targeting
ethnic and political groups has claimed the lives of somewhere
between 12 and 22 million non-combatants in the latter half of the
twentieth century alone (Harff, 2003).1 Events in Darfur and in
Syria today already indicate that the twenty-ﬁrst century will not
see an end to such killing. The strong international norm to prevent
these enormous losses of life has motivated several systematic
macro-level studies in the last two decades to identify risk factors
predisposing countries to such violence (Harff, 2003; Krain, 1997;
Rummel, 1995; B. Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004; Way-
man & Tago, 2010). Today, as a result of this important work, we
better understand the forces behind the tragedies that befell Bos-
nia, Rwanda, and Darfur and we can more readily identify those
countries vulnerable to such violence in the future.
Yet genocides frequently involve multiple episodes of violence
whose occurrence varies in time and space (King, 2004). In contrast
with the cross-national research, we know considerably less about
the systematic determinants of such sub-national violence. Why
did Prijedor municipality become the site of one the largestLtd. This is an open access article umassacres during the war in BosniaeHerzegovina, but Livno mu-
nicipality escape virtually untouched? In Rwanda, why did the
killing begin immediately in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi prefectures, but
not until several weeks later in Butare and Gitarama? In Sudan, why
did ‘Janjaweed’ raids on villages initially concentrate in North
Darfur state and not escalate in South Darfur until several months
later? Is this temporal and spatial variation in violence predictable?
If so, what predicts it?
I contend that the onset of such violence is predictable. When
andwhere violence occurs is neither altogether random nor wholly
idiosyncratic. I present a non-formal model, comprising two
theoretical constructs, to conceptualize the risk of intra-genocide
violence: extremist elite control of the state from above and the
segregation of society from below. Themodel predicts that in places
where the extremists' control is weak and the social integration of
ethnic groups is strong, resistance is high and violence will be
delayed or averted. The causal logic is twofold. First, an inter-elite
contest for control between pro-violence extremists and anti-
violence moderates will arise in weakly-controlled areas and it
will take time for this power struggle to resolve. Second, well-
integrated communities are more socially cohesive and resist
extremist attempts to divide them, and thus require time to over-
come interethnic bonds of trust and to destroy social capital.nder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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social integration is weak, susceptibility is high and violence will
occur early on. The causal logic here is ﬁrst that the absence of any
challenge to their control permits extremists to deploy the state's
formidable power against the targeted group rapidly and without
constraint. Second, extremist entrepreneurs in segregated societies
may exploit existing interethnic distrust and readily mobilize
communities against targeted groups. Finally, in areas where
extremist elite control and social integration are either simulta-
neously strong or simultaneously weak, the model predicts an in-
termediate onset of violence. Table 1 summarizes these predictions.
I develop this model and its constituent constructs from extant
theoretical and empirical research on comparative genocide and
test it with the case of Rwanda's genocide by examining sub-
national variation in the onset of violence across the country's 145
administrative communes in 1994. I draw on new meso-level data
to do so. Genocidal violence targeting primarily the country's ethnic
Tutsi minority began on 6th April 1994, following the assassination
of Rwanda's Hutu president, and lasted just over 100 days. Some
communes experienced violence almost immediately, but others
experienced violence several weeks later. The time until onset was
indicative of a community's susceptibility or resistance to violence.
The empirical ﬁndings support the theoretical model, deep-
ening our understanding of Rwanda's genocide speciﬁcally and
yielding several implications for genocides more generally. First,
previous research on Rwanda's genocide explained local variation
in violence onset primarily in terms of the time needed to mount
either an internal challenge or an external incursion for control of
the locality by civilian or military forces (Straus, 2006). This paper
suggests this explanation is incomplete. It overlooks the deeper
social forces from below that bound communities together and
accounted for resistance to efforts to divide them. Second, linked to
this, the ﬁndings suggest the distinction between two competing
perspectives in explanations of genocides e elite agency and social
structure e should be softened. Forces from above and below can
and do operate together to produce violence. Third, the ﬁndings
reveal dynamic determinants of violence reinforcing the emerging
consensus that genocide is better conceptualized as a continuous
process than as a discrete event. Both the passage of time and
spatial contagion proved dynamic accelerators of this process.
Finally, the ﬁndings have implications for policy-makers confronted
with impending or ongoing genocides but constrained by weak
political will. Knowing when and where violence is most and least
likely to break out is valuable information for strategically priori-
tizing limited intervention resources.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section two situates the paper
theoretically, setting out the model and additional hypotheses from
the extant literature and their operationalization. Section three de-
scribes the research design, case selection, and the techniques used.
Section four presents the results of both the quantitative and qual-
itative analyses, and section ﬁve elaborates further on the above-
mentioned theoretical and policy implications of the ﬁndings.
Theoretical framework and hypotheses
The comparative study of genocide has advanced considerably
since the ﬁrst generation of research in the 1970s and 1980s (Straus,Table 1
Modelling genocidal violence onset at the sub-national level.
Extremist elite control
Strong Weak
Social integration High Intermediate onset Late or no onset
Low Early onset Intermediate onset2007). Much of what we know today comes from two methodo-
logically distinct literatures. The ﬁrst, older body of literature draws
predominantly on comparative historical analysis to trace the ori-
gins and causes of genocides (Fein, 1993; Horowitz, 1976; Kuper,
1982; Mann, 2005; Melson, 1992; Midlarsky, 2005; Semelin,
2005). The second corpus of literature, cited previously, relies pri-
marily on quantitative, cross-national analysis to identify pre-
dictors of genocide onset or severity. Together, the two approaches
have generated a rich set of ideas for how and why genocides occur
that present opportunities for systematic hypothesis testing.
Broadly, these ideas may be categorized as relating to (i) state
development and regime type; (ii) elite survival strategies; (iii)
social divisions and cultural differences; (iv) radical ideologies; (v)
economic crises causing hardship and deprivation; (vi) political
upheavals resulting from civil wars, coups, and revolutions; and
(vii) past violence and atrocities.
Yet comparative research on genocide, when focused at the
macro level, faces limitations. First, genocide is a rare event. The
universe of cases is small and inferences require caution. Second,
comparisons across studies are restricted by unit heterogeneity.
There is no consensus on the deﬁnition of genocide among re-
searchers. In addition, studies have examined overlapping but
distinct phenomena such as politicides (Harff, 2003), democides
(Rummel, 1995), state-sponsored mass murders (Krain, 1997), and
mass killing events (B. Valentino et al., 2004). Third, in the case of
quantitative cross-national analyses, exact causal mechanisms are
difﬁcult to discern. While correlates of genocide are known with
some conﬁdence, why and how they matter is less certain. Fourth,
in the case of comparative historical analyses, few vary the
dependent variable. Studies of cases where genocide occurred are
vulnerable to selection bias because of their exclusion of negative
cases.
One promising approach to addressing some of these limitations
is through disaggregation. By moving from macro- to meso- or
micro-level analysis, a potentially larger set of units to compare
becomes available. These units enjoy greater homogeneity and
consequently have fewer differences for which to control. Impor-
tantly, disaggregation also usually involves variation in the
outcome of interest. The last decade has seen the study of social
violence take a ‘micropolitical turn’ (King, 2004) and the call for
further disaggregation has been well-sounded (O'Loughlin &
Raleigh, 2008). Disaggregation has been especially pronounced in
the study of civil wars where spatial analysis has provided valuable
insights into the determinants and dynamics of such sub-national
violence (Buhaug & Lujala, 2005; Buhaug & Rød, 2006; Raleigh &
Hegre, 2009). This paper extends the sub-national approach to
the study of genocidal violence and adds to the small but growing
body of work in this area (Finkel & Straus, 2012). The sub-national
focus minimizes the difﬁculties in deﬁning genocide that affect
cross-national analysis. Micro-level research into genocidal
violence, whose unit of analysis is typically the individual, has
expanded. This research has provided rich insights into the
Rwandan genocide for example (Fujii, 2009; McDoom, 2013b;
Verwimp, 2005). To a lesser extent, meso-level research, where
the unit of analysis typically comprises places, events, and in-
stitutions at the sub-national level, is also increasing. It includes
several comparative studies of Holocaust violence (Dumitru &
Johnson, 2011; Kopstein &Wittenberg, 2011).
I synthesize theoretical insights from these two methodolog-
ically distinct literatures to develop a parsimonious model of
intra-genocide violence and to test additional hypotheses on the
determinants of genocidal violence at the meso-level. While
meso-analysis offers the advantages outlined above, it too has
limitations. Notably, it clearly cannot tell us why and under what
conditions genocides occur in the ﬁrst place. As meso-analysis
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ability of its ﬁndings will potentially also be limited. Moreover, not
all the concepts that emerge from the macro-focused literature
can be meaningfully operationalized at the meso level. Ideational
variables such as purity, modernity, and utopia, for example, are
not readily susceptible to systematic disaggregation. Limitations
notwithstanding, meso-analysis may tell us why violence within
genocides occurs in some places at certain times. This remains
valuable information to decision makers contemplating interna-
tional intervention.
Scope conditions
Genocide is a deeply contested concept. Disagreement exists on
almost every deﬁnitional element: the victim groups protected, the
perpetrating agents recognized, the modes of extermination
permitted, and whether speciﬁc intention is required, inter alia.
Although this debate is outside the scope of this paper, I provide a
working deﬁnition solely to delimit the applicability of the theo-
retical model proposed. Genocide is violence organized by in-
dividuals who control the state deliberately targeting a group they
perceive as ethnically distinct. Genocide then requires intentional
targeting; the perpetrators do not act in a private capacity; the
victim group is ethnically and subjectively deﬁned; and the mode
of destruction requires violence. This deﬁnition would then for
instance include violence in Rwanda (1994), Darfur (2003-), Bosnia
(1992e5), Myanmar (1978), Iraq (1988), and Burundi (1988 and
1993). It would, however, exclude South Vietnam (1965e75)
because the target was not ethnic, Sri Lanka (1983e2009) because
the intention was not extermination, IndiaePakistan (1947)
because the perpetrators were primarily private citizens, and the
Ukraine (1932e33) because the mode of destructionwas deliberate
starvation, not physical violence.
Theoretical model
Elite control
Elite control of the state is the ﬁrst of themodel's two theoretical
constructs. When extremists control the state, they possess the
means to turn its formidable power against its citizens and commit
genocide. I develop the construct by synthesizing three ideas in
extant macro-level research on genocide that highlight separately
the role of themodern state, the importance of regime type, and the
centrality of elite strategy.
First, it is argued the modern state matters because it possesses
the power to harm its civilian population on a scale more massive
than almost any other actor. This power comprises both material
capabilities and symbolic authority. Genocide scholarship has
emphasized the former, noting the state's ability to coordinate,
control, and coerce (Semelin, 2005; B. Valentino et al., 2004). The
state can kill using its security apparatus, notably the military and
police, or using its civilian apparatus, through policies that forcibly
displace, starve, neglect or otherwise harm civilian communities.
The state's symbolic authority refers to its power to authorize and
legitimize discrimination and violence against targeted groups.
Several comparative studies of genocide have emphasized the po-
litical development of the modern state and the implied decline in
the symbolic authority of traditional bases within society (Levene,
2005; Mann, 2005). The notion is captured in the oft-cited perpe-
trator defence of ‘I was just following orders’. Control of the
modern state's redoubtable power then matters for those intent on
genocide.
Second, scholars have argued regime type matters because au-
tocracies and democracies impose different constraints on the ex-
ercise of the state's massive power (Harff, 2003; Horowitz, 1976;Rummel, 1995). Institutionalist and normative causal logics exist.
In the institutionalist explanation, autocracies are better able to
commit genocide because effective power is often concentrated in a
single institution (e.g. the Presidency), whereas in democracies it is
often diffused across multiple institutions. In the normative
explanation, democracies are less likely to commit genocide
because they generally respect human rights and value tolerance,
whereas autocracies, especially totalitarian regimes, generally do
not. Weaker constraints give the ruling elite stronger control of the
state's power.
Lastly, scholarship has highlighted elite strategy because the
decision to commit genocide often results from the calculation of
the privileged few who control the state's power (B. A. Valentino,
2004). Genocide has for instance been considered a survival
strategy or a calculated response to a threat posed to the ruling
elite's control of the state's power (Figueiredo &Weingast, 1999).
Extreme threats generate extreme responses. Together, these
three ideas point to the importance of elite control of the state's
power. This control matters not only at the national level, but at
the local level too. For in localities where the extremist elite's
control is weak, resistance to the pressure for violence will be
high.
Hypothesis 1: The weaker the extremist elite's control at the local
level, the later the onset of violence in that locality.
I distinguish two measures of elite control: political and mili-
tary. Political control rests on consent to or compliance with the
ruling elite's exercise of the state's power. Military control rests on
coercion or the use of force in the exercise of this power. To mea-
sure political control, I examine the party afﬁliation of the elite in
charge at two local levels: prefectural and communal. Rwanda
comprised 11 prefectures and 145 communes in 1994. In 1991,
having been a one-party state for most of its post-independence
history, Rwanda re-introduced multipartyism. The move created
15 new political parties. In 1993, local elections in a number of
Rwanda's administrative communes resulted in the victory of op-
position parties in several communes. With assistance from in-
house experts at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), I constructed a dataset identifying communes and pre-
fectures headed by loyalist and opposition burgomasters and pre-
fects in 1994. Opposition-controlled localities were coded 1; those
held by the ruling party were coded as 0. To measure military
control, I adapt Weber's axiomatic deﬁnition of the state to deﬁne
control as possession of the monopoly on force within a territory. I
use extant research mapping the territorial advance, day-by-day, of
the rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (Davenport &
Stam). These micro-data indicate with precision on what day a
commune was under either government or rebel military control
during the genocide. Government control was coded as 0; rebel
control as 1.
Social segregation
Segregation along ethnic lines is the second theoretical
construct in the model. Early research on genocide emphasized
‘deep divisions’ within society (Kuper, 1982). These divisions could
be expressed as prejudice and discrimination, and in extreme cases
as dehumanization (Charny & Berger, 1988) or exclusion from the
moral universe (Fein, 1993). Ethnic outgroups are vulnerable to
targeting in deeply-divided or highly-segregated societies.
Yet social divisions have proved difﬁcult both to conceptualize
and to measure. Quantitative cross-national research on violent
conﬂict has conventionally focused on ethnic diversity and had
mixed ﬁndings (Collier & Hoefﬂer, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003).
Originally used to explain poor public good provision and economic
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rather than relations. It assumed that co-ethnics had similar pref-
erences and it was this similarity that encouraged trust and coop-
eration between them (Alesina, Baqir, & Easterly, 1999; Easterly &
Levine, 1997). Conversely, individuals of different ethnicity had
different preferences. These preferences conﬂicted, creating
distrust and discouraging cooperation. This theoretical logic was
extended to explanations of violent conﬂict, albeit less explicitly,
and led to the unconvincing suggestion that more diversity
necessarily signiﬁed more societal conﬂict.
Furthermore, the most common measure of heterogeneity, the
ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (ELF), which measures the
probability that two randomly selected individuals from a com-
munity will be of different ethnicity, has three shortcomings as a
valid measure of social division. It inadequately captures the sig-
niﬁcance of group size, ignores the spatial organization of groups,
and ignores the intensity of group differences (Posner, 2004). A
second measure, the ethnic polarization index, improves upon the
ELF by better conceptualizing group size, but does not address the
two other validity issues (Reynal-Querol, 2002).
I propose an alternate conceptualization of social divisions.
The construct of social segregation emphasizes interpersonal
relations rather than individual preferences. I suggest social
interaction rather than social differentiation better predicts so-
cietal divisions and draw on social capital theory to develop the
intuition underlying the construct. Communities with high social
capital are well-integrated with multiple, strong bonds between
community members. When a community comprises distinct
social groups, bonds that bridge these divides build trust, in-
crease cooperation, and generally produce positive intergroup
relations. Such a community will resist attempts to divide it
along ethnic, racial, or other group lines. Conversely, commu-
nities with low social capital are segregated with few or weak
interethnic bonds and are characterized by generally negative
intergroup relations. Ethnic entrepreneurs readily divide such
communities by exploiting existing negative sentiments such as
distrust, fear, resentment, hostility, and prejudice between
groups.
Hypothesis 2: The higher the degree of segregation at the local
level, the earlier the onset of violence.
To capture social relations, I construct a segregation index using
census micro-data from Rwanda. Sociologists studying racial resi-
dential patterns in the United States have developed various
measures to capture distinct dimensions of segregation (Massey &
Denton, 1988). The relative importance of the main dimensions e
exposure, evenness, clustering, concentration, and centralization e
remains the subject of debate (Reardon & O'Sullivan, 2004). The
dimension, however, that best captures social relations, the
mechanism proposed here, is exposure. Conceptually, exposure
approximates intergroup interaction spatially by measuring the
likelihood that a randomly selected member of one group would
live in the same geographic neighbourhood as a randomly selected
individual of the other group (Lieberson, 1981). Technically, the
exposure index I propose is the minority-weighted average of each
geographic neighbourhood's majority proportion, denoted as I
here:
I ¼
Xn
i¼1
½xi=X½yi=ti
where xi is the minority size (number of Tutsi in Rwanda), yi is the
majority size (the number of Hutu), and ti is the total population ofthe geographic neighbourhood i (the Rwandan ‘sector’), and X is
the overall minority size in the larger geographic community under
comparison (the Rwandan ‘commune’). I scale the index from 0 to
100 where a higher score indicates a higher level of integration and
control for the differing proportions of Tutsi across communes.
Although it overcomes shortcomings in fractionalization mea-
sures, the segregation index has two potential limitations. It does
not capture differences in spatial patterns within the areal unit
(White, 1983) and its value may depend upon the size of the
particular areal units chosen for comparison (Openshaw, 1983).
Nonetheless, the sector is a very small unit, averaging 1000
households, and is comparable to US census tracts, the level at
which segregation is typically measured. Furthermore, the
commune was the most important unit of political and social or-
ganization in Rwanda. It provided public services and recorded
demographic change, notably births and deaths, at the local level.
Settlement patterns at this level then were likely to be meaningful.Additional hypotheses
Existing research on comparative genocide has suggested
several other determinants of genocide onset. I extract the under-
lying causal logic of these macro-level predictors to identify those
that could potentially also affect onset at the meso-level.Security threat
A robust ﬁnding in the comparative research is that genocides
often occur in the context of armed conﬂicts (Harff, 2003). Theory
suggests two causal mechanisms. At the macro-level the mecha-
nism is political opportunity. Breaks in the political opportunity
structure created by wardor other upheavals such as revolutions
and coupsdincrease the likelihood of genocide onset (Krain, 1997).
Challengers exploiting these opportunities threaten the incumbent
elite's position of power and this elite becomes increasingly willing
to undertake radical action to counter the threat (Figueiredo &
Weingast, 1999). At the micro-level the mechanism is fear. Politi-
cal upheavals create intense uncertainty for the future. In the case
of upheaval through war, it is uncertainty for individual and col-
lective security. In contrast with the strategic, elite-centric focus of
the opportunity mechanism, the emphasis here is on non-elite,
emotional reactions to threat.
Hypothesis 3: The greater the security threat at the local level, the
earlier the onset of violence.
As the model examines sub-national variation, I test the oper-
ation of the micro-level fear mechanism. I measure the shortest
distance from the war's front-lines to the centroid point of each
commune to proxy the insecurity felt within communities: the
closer to the war, the greater the insecurity. Communities close to
the front-lines would experience the direct effects of war ﬁrsthand.
In Rwanda this included militarization of the area, casualties, ref-
ugees, privations, and unworked land for instance.Hardship and deprivation
Research has also suggested that genocides often occur in times
of economic hardship. One such claim relates to the notion of
‘difﬁcult living conditions’ (Staub,1989). Amore sophisticated claim
points to ‘structural violence’, conceptualized as inequality, exclu-
sion, and the humiliation of poverty (Uvin, 1998). The psychological
mechanism implicit in such claims is a frustration-aggression
nexus. Individuals deprived of life opportunities experience anger
that may be directed towards others.
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earlier the onset of the violence.
I measure hardship and deprivation using three alternate socio-
economic indicators. First, I examine educational attainment data.
Speciﬁcally, I consider sub-national variation in literacy rates. Sec-
ond, I consider variation in asset ownership at the local level, in
particular the value of individual dwelling homes. In rural Africa,
poorer homes would be built of freely available wood and mud,
whereas wealthier households used baked bricks or concrete
blocks that required purchase. Lastly, I consider population density.
Rwanda's extraordinarily high demographic density exerted
considerable ecological pressure on land and has inspired neo-
Malthusian explanations of its violence (Andre & Platteau, 1998;
Verpoorten, 2012). The effects of land scarcity would be particu-
larly acute in an agriculture-dependent society.
Prior violence
The cyclical character of violence has been empirically estab-
lished in research on civil wars (Walter, 2004) and genocide (Harff,
2003). Communities that have experienced violence in the past are
likely to experience violence in the future. Two possible causal
logics exist: similar conditions and transformative effects. Violence
may recur ﬁrst because the actors, processes, and other forces
involved in earlier violence continue to be present in affected
communities. Alternatively, violence may recur because it has
transformed communities making them more violence-prone. In-
dividuals may have become habituated to violence; acquired new
grievances as a result of violence; or been emboldened by impunity
for previous violence.
Hypothesis 5: Communities that have previously experienced
violence are more likely to experience early onset of violence.
Drawing on detailed international human rights reports from
the time, I identify communes that had experienced anti-Tutsi
violence in the course of Rwanda's ongoing civil war up until the
start of its genocidal phase in April 1994. An average of 200 Tutsi
were killed in each of the seven communes affected. Communes
that had experienced such violence before 6th April 1994 were
coded as 1; those that had not were coded as 0.
Spatial contagion
Civil war violence has had demonstrated spillover effects across
national boundaries and escalatory effects within national bound-
aries (Schutte &Weidmann, 2011). The causal mechanisms behind
contagion are potentially varied and complex. I highlight three: (i)
linkages: pro-violence individuals in one community inﬂuence
individuals with whom they have ties in neighbouring commu-
nities; (ii) demonstration effect: individuals are inspired to imitate
what they observe occurring in a neighbouring community; and
(iii) mobility: proximity facilitates the cross-border movement of
individuals and resources associated with violence such as com-
batants, refugees, weapons, and plunder.
Hypothesis 6: The more communities to have succumbed to
violence in a preceding time period, the earlier the onset of violence
will be in a neighbouring community.
To measure contagion I calculate the number of geographically
adjacent communes that had experienced violence in a time period
prior to the onset of violence in each of Rwanda's 145 communes.
Temporal antecedence minimizes the effect of spatial auto-
correlation i.e. the explanation that geographically proximate
areas would share similar characteristics.Research design and methods
The research design combines a quantitative duration analysis
of violence onset across Rwanda's 145 communes with a within-
case comparative analysis of two communes that experienced
early and late onset. The selection of a meso-level unit-of-anal-
ysis, the commune, provided a reasonable number of units to
compare, good unit homogeneity, and the prospect of variation in
the dependent variable. Duration analysis estimates the risk of an
event occurring to a particular subject in a given time period, the
hazard rate (Allison, 1984). Here, the event of interest is the onset
of violence and the subjects are Rwanda's 145 communes.
Communes with higher hazard rates are at greater risk of
violence. Duration analysis has two desirable features for this
type of study: it permits the speciﬁcation of time-varying pa-
rameters and it can model the effect of time on the outcome of
interest.
Thewithin-case analyses contextualize the quantitative ﬁndings
and explore possible causal mechanisms at work. I compare two
communes: Mukingo (early onset) and Taba (late onset). Fig. 1 sit-
uates them geographically. Initial case selection was random but
data quality dictated ﬁnal selection. The ICTR had intensively
investigated events in Mukingo and Taba and generated carefully-
veriﬁed micro-data on the genocide from extensive witness state-
ments and exhibits. The analyses drawon facts judicially established
using the evidentiary standard of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ in the
Prosecutor vs. Akayesu for Taba and the Prosecutor vs. Kajilijeli, the
Prosecutor vs. Nzizorera, and the Prosecutor vs. Setako forMukingo.
Given purposive selection on the dependent variable, the two cases
then are susceptible to selection bias and are not intended to test a
priori hypotheses or establish causal inferences (Geddes, 1990).
The cases, however, are used to illustrate the causal process
behind violence onset and thus to understand how and why the
determinants identiﬁed in the quantitative analysis mattered
(D. Collier, Brady, & Seawright, 2010). Fig. 2 traces this process for
each commune.
Synopsis of Rwanda's genocide
In April 1994, a small group of ethnic Hutu extremists seized
power in Rwanda and initiated a genocidal campaign targeting
the ethnic Tutsi minority for extermination. The violence
unleashed was remarkable for its intensity, its ambit, and its
speed. Starting on 6th April 1994, the violence would spread to
almost every commune in Rwanda and, within just over 100
days, would claim the lives of an estimated 500,000 Tutsi and
several tens of thousands of the Hutu majority (Des Forges, 1999).
Their killers were soldiers, police, militia, and other ordinary
Rwandans.
The genocide was the culmination of a civil war, begun in
October 1990 and fought between a mainly-Tutsi rebel army, the
Rwandan Patriotic Front, and Rwanda's Hutu-dominated govern-
ment. The war's roots lay in a revolution, shortly before Rwanda's
independence from Belgium in 1962, which toppled the long-
standing Tutsi monarchy and installed Rwanda's ﬁrst Hutu Republic
that would exclude Tutsi from political power for the next three
decades. The revolution sent hundreds of thousands of Tutsi into
exile and these exiles would make several unsuccessful armed at-
tempts in the 1960s to return to Rwanda. However, it was not until
the exiles' descendants initiated the civil war in 1990 and the
reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1991, that the Hutu mo-
nopoly on power would weaken. In August 1993, the international
community brokered a peace deal that envisaged power-sharing
between the incumbent regime, the newly-formed opposition
parties, and the rebel RPF. Hutu hardliners opposed the deal,
Fig. 1. Onset of genocidal violence in Rwanda 1994.
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6th April 1994 (by assassins still unknown), these hardliners seized
the opportunity to take control, re-ignite the civil war, and initiate
the genocide. Over the next three weeks violence would break out
in almost all of Rwanda's 145 communes. The international com-
munity failed to intervene and it was not until the RPF ﬁnally
defeated the extremist government in July 1994 that the killing
would end.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable is violence onset, or more precisely in
duration analysis, the rate of violence onset. This may be concep-
tualized more simply as the speed at which violence occurred in
Rwanda. I employ Straus' data on onset that triangulates six distinct
sources to reach the best known estimate of when violence ﬁrstbegan in each of Rwanda's communes (Straus, 2006).2 Straus de-
ﬁnes genocidal violence as ‘public and generalized attacks against
Tutsi’ and identiﬁes seven different time periods, each of three days
duration starting from 6th April 1994, in which violence began
across Rwanda's communes. Reliance on a third party's coding of
violence onset reduces the risk of choosing values for the depen-
dent variable that would support a researcher's prior beliefs.
Results
Quantitative analysis
I present both descriptive statistics (Table 3, Appendix) and
ﬁndings from the multivariate duration analysis (Table 2). The
multivariate analysis comprises results from a proportional odds
(logit) model, whose exponentiated coefﬁcients are interpreted as
Fig. 2. Tracing process of violence onset in two Rwandan communes.
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hazards (complementary log log) model, whose exponentiated
coefﬁcients are equivalent to the hazard ratio. The latter model is
insensitive to the speciﬁcation of the time interval and thus useful
to estimate given reliance on Straus' data that measures violence
onset in three-day intervals. I report two speciﬁcations for each
model class: a full unrestricted model (models 1 and 3) and a more
restricted, parsimonious model (models 2 and 4). To avoid a priori
assumptions concerning the probability distribution of violence
onset, both models are fully non-parametric and include k  1
dummies where k refers to the number of time intervals in the
analysis. The full model's speciﬁcation is derived from theory and
tests all hypothesized predictors identiﬁed earlier in the theoretical
framework simultaneously. I also control for distance to the capital
(a proxy for the state's reach), distance to the Burundian border
(Burundian Hutu refugees were highly active in the commission of
violence during the genocide), and whether the commune con-
tained an urban centre. The parameters of the parsimonious modelTable 2
Proportional odds and proportional hazards models predicting genocidal onset across Rw
Logit models: odds ratio (n ¼ 443)
Model 1 (full) Model 2
Elite control I (political: commune) 0.46** (0.14) 0.44***
Elite control II (political: prefecture) 0.39*** (0.14) 0.31***
Elite control III (military) 0.07*** (0.04) 0.09***
Social segregation 0.89** (0.04) 0.91**
Tutsi proportion 0.90** (0.05) 0.91**
Security threat 0.99 (0.01)
Population density 1.10 (0.09) 1.11
Literacy 1.03 (0.08)
Wealth 0.99 (0.01)
Past violence 66.94** (132.42) 76.45**
Contagion 1.23** (0.12) 1.22**
Distance to capital 1.01 (0.01)
Urban 0.91 (0.42)
Distance to Burundian border 0.99 (0.01)
Time1 1.26 (0.68) 1.25
Time2 1.20 (0.67) 1.14
Time3 0.50 (0.31) 0.47
Time4 0.31 (0.22) 0.29*
Time5 1.78 (1.05) 1.71
Time6 4.87** (3.02) 4.63**
Dependent variable is genocidal onset (0 ¼ no onset, 1 ¼ onset). Standard errors in parewere obtained by systematically removing one variable one at a
time from the full model using stepwise backward selection. As
these were nested models, I tested the relative ﬁt of each model
using a likelihood ratio test. I begin with an analysis of the
descriptive data on onset, then report the ﬁndings of the regression
analysis on the hypothesized predictors, and ﬁnally describe the
robustness checks undertaken.
Onset. The descriptive data on violence onset (Table 4, Appendix)
reveal two remarkable features of Rwanda's genocide: its nation-
wide ambit and its extraordinary speed. Of Rwanda's 145 com-
munes, only 11 did not succumb to anti-Tutsi violence. All but one
were communes either controlled by the rebel group or part of the
demilitarized zone at the time of the president's assassination.
Moreover, the majority of communes that did succumb to violence
(58.6 per cent) did so within the ﬁrst six days (two time periods)
following the president's assassination. The violence then ignited
rapidly. However, the data also show that nearly one third ofanda's communes in 1994.
Comp. log log models: Hazard ratio (n ¼ 443)
(parsimonious) Model 3 (full) Model 4 (parsimonious)
(0.13) 0.54** (0.13) 0.52*** (0.12)
(0.09) 0.53** (0.15) 0.43*** (0.10)
(0.04) 0.12*** (0.05) 0.15*** (0.05)
(0.04) 0.92*** (0.03) 0.93*** (0.02)
(0.04) 0.93** (0.03) 0.93** (0.03)
0.99 (0.01)
(0.08) 1.10 (0.07) 1.11* (0.06)
1.01 (0.06)
0.99 (0.01)
(148.47) 17.89** (25.44) 22.21** (31.60)
(0.11) 1.16** (0.09) 1.15* (0.09)
1.01 (0.01)
0.96 (0.34)
0.99 (0.01)
(0.66) 1.14 (0.45) 1.14 (0.45)
(0.63) 1.08 (0.44) 1.05 (0.43)
(0.30) 0.52 (0.26) 0.50 (0.25)
(0.21) 0.31* (0.19) 0.30* (0.19)
(0.99) 1.33 (0.57) 1.29 (0.55)
(2.84) 3.00** (1.29) 2.89** (1.23)
ntheses. */**/***Statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
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after the assassination. As Fig. 1 illustrates the majority were
concentrated in the central and southern prefectures of Gitarama
and Butare. This seemingly small variation was not, as I will show,
random. It was indicative of a region's susceptibility or resistance to
violence.
Elite control. Communes and prefectures politically controlled by
the ruling elite succumbed to violence sooner than those controlled
by opposition parties. Of all communes where violence broke out in
the ﬁrst three days (time period 1), 54 were controlled by the
burgomasters loyal to the ruling party and only six by burgomasters
belonging to opposition parties. In contrast, of all communes where
violence broke out late (time period 6), 12 were controlled by op-
position burgomasters and ﬁve by burgomasters belonging to the
ruling party. The multivariate analysis conﬁrms local political
control mattered. Table 2 indicates opposition control at the
communal level decreased the odds of violence occurring by 54 per
cent and the hazard rate by 46 per cent, and at the prefectural level
by 61 per cent and 69 per cent, holding all other variables constant.
The within-case analysis to follow suggests the mechanism behind
delayed onset was a power struggle between moderates and ex-
tremists for control of the prefectures and communes following the
president's assassination.
Similarly, communesmilitarily controlled by the ruling elite also
succumbed to violence sooner than those in the demilitarized zone
(DMZ) or under rebel control. Formally, extremist military control
increased the odds of violence occurring by 93 per cent and the
hazard rate by 89 per cent, holding other variables constant. The
ﬁnding is not trivial. The presence of the DMZ or rebels necessarily
signiﬁed the absence of government soldiers and militia. The data
indicate that in the latter's absence violence was highly unlikely to
occur. It suggests then state agents played an important role in
inciting or committing violence and the genocide was not simply a
spontaneous explosion of popular sentiment from below.
Social segregation. Hutu and Tutsi were, on average, well-
integrated in Rwanda. They did not live in geographically
distinct regions, but rather side-by-side as neighbours. The
segregation index is high with a mean score of 86.7. There was,
however, considerable variation in integration levels between
communes. Scores ranged from 10.4 to 100.0. The multivariate
analysis conﬁrms, consistent with theory, that communes with
higher levels of segregation experienced violence sooner than
communes that were better integrated. Formally, the segregation
index indicates that a one percentage increase in the probability of
a randomly selected Tutsi living in the same area as a Hutu
decreased the odds of violence occurring by 11 per cent and the
hazard rate by nine per cent, holding all other variables constant.
As the within-case analysis will suggest, the mechanism is inter-
ethnic trust and cooperation. The better-integrated community
initially resisted the forces that sought to divide them and
produced a display of ethnic solidarity. None of the alternate
measures reported in the Appendix e ethnic proportion, frac-
tionalization, or polarization e proved signiﬁcant. The proportion
of Tutsi in the commune was signiﬁcant but only in conjunction
with the segregation variable. Caution then should be exercised in
drawing inferences from this.
Contagion effect. The results suggest violence is highly contagious.
The data conﬁrm that the greater the number of its neighbouring
communes already experiencing violence, the more likely a
commune is to succumb to violence. Each additional adjacent
commune that succumbs to violence in a previous time periodincreases the odds of violence occurring in a commune by 23 per
cent and the hazard rate by 22 per cent, ceteris paribus.
Past violence. Seven communes in the dataset had experienced
signiﬁcant anti-Tutsi violence prior to April 6th 1994. Table 4 shows
that all seven communes descended into genocidal violence
immediately following the president's assassination (time period
1). Past violence then perfectly predicted genocidal onset. As a
perfect predictor is a problematic estimator with binary data,
signifying quasi-separation in the data analysis, I employed a form
of penalized likelihood (Zorn, 2005). Nonetheless, caution again
should be exercised in drawing inferences given the small number
of communes and the large standard errors involved as a
consequence.
Time. The passage of time also had an independent effect on onset.
Testing for the removal of the six time dummies from the model
conﬁrm their collective signiﬁcance. The non-parametric speciﬁ-
cation allows us to see that the relationship is non-monotonic. The
coefﬁcients initially decline and then rise again. This is also re-
ﬂected in the hazard function. Fig. 3 in the appendix indicates the
function is a U-shape: the likelihood of violence was high at the
start, declined, and then increased again. The relationship then is
not simply exponential. It instead suggests there exists a tipping or
inﬂection point in resistance to the violence.
Non-signiﬁcant ﬁndings. I found no support for a prediction of
violence onset based on literacy, wealth, or population density
levels. It is worth noting other research, however, has supported a
correlation between population density and violence intensity,
though not onset (Verpoorten, 2012). One interpretation is neo-
Malthusian: too many people, too little land. Newer research sug-
gests another possible mechanism. Violence spreads quickly in
densely-populated areas because of high levels of interpersonal
contact (McDoom, 2013a). None of the three distance proxies
proved signiﬁcant. Distance to the war's front lines, distance to the
capital, and distance to the Burundian border did not predict onset.
It is possible these were poor proxies. Otherwise it suggests inse-
curity felt, state power, and the presence of Burundian Hutu refu-
gees did not affect a commune's susceptibility to violence.
Robustness checks. The ﬁndings are robust to various model spec-
iﬁcations. In addition to the four main models in Table 2, an online
appendix contains 35 further speciﬁcations. I report nested models
estimated using stepwise backward selection and tested using
likelihood ratio tests. Individual parameters are also tested using
Wald tests. I also report 'frailty' models. Frailty refers to character-
istics speciﬁc to individual communes, uncorrelated with the pre-
dictor variables, that may affect susceptibility to violence and is
thus the equivalent of testing for random effects. I additionally
estimate spatial regression lagmodels to control for possible spatial
auto-correlation that may not be captured in the 'contagion' vari-
able speciﬁed in the main models. I also estimate the main models
without those communes under rebel control or in the DMZ. Lastly,
I report alternate coefﬁcients estimated using techniques to
improve the comparability and interpretation of substantive effects
across models.
Qualitative analysis
Late onset: Taba commune
In Taba, genocidal violence did not begin until 19th April 1994,
almost two weeks after the president's assassination. Interethnic
relations in the region were historically strong. Taba was located
within Gitarama, one of 11 prefectures comprising Rwanda in 1994.
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estimated 83,000 Tutsi in April 1994, the third largest number of all
Rwanda's prefectures. Historically, the Hutu of the central and
southern prefectures of Gitarama and Butare had been closely
associated with the Tutsi. The Abanyanduga, as the region's in-
habitantswereknown, hadparticipated in theTutsi king's conquests
of theAbakiga in thepredominantlyHutunorth. Politically,Gitarama
had weak ties to the ruling MRND party. The prefecture was the
birthplace of the MDR-Parmehutu, the forerunner of the opposition
MDR party. It was the party that ﬁrst ruled Rwanda following in-
dependence in 1962. Its latterday successor emerged with the
reintroduction of multipartyism in 1991 and directed its energies
towards attacking the ruling party on its poor governance record.
Gitarama was the MDR's stronghold. fourteen of its 17 commune
burgomasters and its prefect, Fidele Uwizeye, were party members.
The outbreak of the civil war in October 1990, popularly
perceived in ethnic terms, marked a critical juncture in the trajec-
tory towards genocide. However, in Taba, partly due to its distance
from the warfront, interethnic relations remained largely unaf-
fected. Tabawas home to an estimated 4680 Tutsi in April 1994, just
over 8 per cent of the population. The commune experienced no
incidents of ethnic violence before April 1994. Its Hutu and Tutsi
communities maintained their historically strong ethnic cohesion.
The introduction of multipartyism in Rwanda in June 1991, a
second critical juncture, did, however, impact Taba. In March 1993,
in an election for the position of burgomaster, the opposition MDR
ousted the ruling MRND, which had controlled the commune for
nearly two decades. 41 year old Taba native, Jean-Paul Akayesu,
became burgomaster. Although Akayesu commanded widespread
popular support within the commune, his MRND rival, Silas Kub-
wimana, persisted in actively opposing him. In the run-up to the
genocide, tensions in Taba continued to follow party rather than
ethnic lines.
When the president was assassinated on 6th April 1994, Taba's
new burgomaster initially resisted the extremist centre and
opposed the violence. He created a safe haven for many of the
incoming Tutsi refugees at his own commune ofﬁces and assigned
three of the commune's ten policemen to protect them. He also
addressed Taba's population on the importance of standing
together. Consistent with their historic ethnic solidarity, Taba's
residents heeded their burgomaster. Hutu and Tutsi initially
cooperated to organize civilian day and night patrols and to man
checkpoints to prevent pro-violence elements from entering Taba.
They reported and resisted attempts from outside elements to
subvert the commune's peaceful order.
Contagion violence from neighbouring communes was in fact
initially weak in Taba. Although it shared its northern border with
Kigali-Rural, a prefecture where violence had begun early on, the
Nyaborongo river ﬂowed along the frontier. The river created a
natural barrier to incursions from Shyorongi and Musasa com-
munes in Kigali-Rural. Moreover, the three other communes
adjoining Tabawere situated within Gitarama and also opposed the
violence. As time passed, however, contagion pressures mounted.
The number of Tutsi refugees increased, and so too did the number
of outside armed incursions. In two notable incidents, vehicles
carrying solders and interahamwe militia attacked the Tutsi refu-
gees at the commune ofﬁce and were repelled by the communal
policemen stationed there. In other incidents, collaborators from
within Taba helped outside attackers enter the commune and
target Tutsi homes. Solidarity and resistance were weakening.
With the passage of time, pressure from the centre alsomounted.
At the prefectural level, prefect Uwizeye struggled to maintain his
authority as his fellow party members and his administrative and
securitystaff separated intoextremistandmoderate factions. Political
control of the region effectively passed frommoderates to extremistswith the interim extremist government's move on 12th April 1994
from the capital Kigali to Gitarama. 1000 or so interahamwe militia
also accompanied the relocation and with their arrival, military
control of the prefecture also passed to the extremists.
In Taba, the contest for political control ended following a fateful
meeting on 18th April 1994 that resulted in burgomaster Akayesu
switching sides. Rwanda's new Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda,
ordered the meeting to be held in his government's new ofﬁces in
Gitarama so that he, his newministers, and extremist party leaders
could directly address the prefecture's resistant leaders. The Prime
Minister read a prepared statement calling for national unity and
then invited extremist party leaders to address and threaten the
burgomasters more directly.
The next day, events took a signiﬁcant turn in Taba. Akayesu
addressed several hundred Taba residents and urged them now to
unite and hunt down the ‘accomplices’ of the rebel enemy. This was
widely understood to mean the Tutsi. His words presaged the mass
killing over the next two days of Taba's Tutsi population. Having
previouslycontested control of Tabawith Silas Kubwimana, Akayesu
now welcomed his extremist rival who had become an honorary
vice-president of the interahamwe. The militia and the military
occupied Akayesu's commune ofﬁces and led attacks, nowwith the
collaboration of Taba residents. The situation continued until June
27th 1994 when Akayesu ﬂed the commune ahead of the rebels'
arrival. The burgomaster would be subsequently convicted of
inciting and participating directly in the genocidal violence in Taba.
Early onset: Mukingo commune
InMukingo, violence began in themorning of 7th April 1994, the
day following the president's assassination. The commune was
located in the northern prefecture of Ruhengeri, a region where
TutsieHutu relations had been historically poor. Together with
Gisenyi prefecture, Ruhengeri was once the site of nine Hutu
principalities whose inhabitants, the Abakiga, had resisted annex-
ation by the Tutsi monarchy until the early twentieth century. In
1994, only 0.5 per cent of Ruhengeri's population was Tutsi, the
smallest concentration in all Rwanda. Politically, the region had
beneﬁted from close connections to the centre. A signiﬁcant pro-
portion of the ruling party elite and president Habyarimana himself
originated from the north. Moreover, all 16 of Ruhengeri's
commune burgomasters and its prefect, Sylvester Bariyanga, were
longstanding members of the ruling MRND.
When the war began in 1990, Mukingo found itself close to its
frontline and the heightened insecurity was accompanied by a
rapid deterioration in interethnic relations. Social cohesion was
weak. Mukingo was home to just under 600 Tutsi in April 1994, a
mere 1.3 per cent of its overall population. The local Hutu elite and
ordinary Hutu residents distrusted the Tutsi community whom
they suspected of supporting and collaborating with the enemy.
Mukingo's burgomaster, Juvenal Kajilijeli, went so far as to draw up
lists of Tutsi resident in his commune. Yet Tutsi suffered more than
mere suspicion. In reprisal for a rebel attack on Ruhengeri's capital
in January 1991, several hundred Bagogwe Tutsi were killed in
state-sanctioned massacres in communes across the north,
including Mukingo. As a consequence many Tutsi had ﬂed the re-
gion long before the genocide began. A second consequence of the
war's proximity was the region's rapid militarization. In neigh-
bouring Nkuli commune, an important military camp was estab-
lished. The camp would not only train the local interahamwe, but
would also provide the weapons used to eliminate the local Tutsi
community during the genocide.
In contrast with the war, the introduction of multipartyism in
1991 changed little in Mukingo. TheMRND ruled without challenge
and no other party, save the radical anti-Tutsi CDR party, operated
openly within the commune or the prefecture. Juvenal Kajilijeli,
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of the genocide, was an MRND loyalist. Before the genocide, Kaji-
lijeli had personally trained a group of 80 MRND interahamwe
whom he would also command during the genocide. These party
militia represented a far more powerful force within the commune
than the nine state-employed policemen. Kajilijeli, a native of
Mukingo, was also a known ethnic extremist. Hewas removed from
ofﬁce in 1993 at the request of the RPF, during peace negotiations
for his alleged involvement in reprisal killings against Tutsi. The
suspicious death of his successor, Emmanuel Harerimana, at the
start of the genocide, possibly at Kajlileli's hand, led to Kajilijeli's
reinstatement as burgomaster in June 1994.
The ruling party then exercised strong political control over the
commune before the genocide. Its inﬂuence was principally
attributable to another native son, Joseph Nzizorera. Nzirorera held
the prominent position of National Secretary of the ruling party and
took a strong interest in the fortunes of his native commune. As the
civil war escalated, Nzirorera travelled regularly on weekends to
Mukingo and chaired meetings with the commune's local elite to
discuss Mukingo's role in theMRND's political andmilitary struggle
with the RPF. It was alleged, but unproven that these meetings also
planned the extermination of the Tutsi in the area. Nzirorera was
also the political patron and longstanding friend of burgomaster
Kajilijeli, who in part owed his status to his association with Nzi-
zorera. At a time when few communes possessed telephones,
Nzirorera was able to communicate his instructions to Kajilijeli,
both before and during the genocide, through the line installed in
the commune ofﬁce.
Rwanda's military establishment also exerted inﬂuence in
Mukingo. The sector commander for Ruhengeri with overall re-
sponsibility for the nearby Mukamira camp, Augustin Bizimingu,
attended the meetings Nzirorera chaired in Mukingo. Bizimungu
would go on to become overall commander of the interim gov-
ernment's forces during the genocide. A second prominent military
ﬁgure, Lieutenant-Colonel Ephrem Setako, also attended the
meetings. A native of neighbouring Nkuli commune, Setako was
Head of Legal Affairs within the defence ministry. Like Nzirorera, he
too served to link a peripheral commune to the decision-making
centre.
When news of the president's assassination reached Mukingo,
there was no question of the commune following the centre's di-
rectives. Burgomaster Kajilijeli, acting upon Nzirorera's telephoned
instructions, called a meeting in a local canteen that same evening.
There, the region's local Hutu elite, including Nkuli commune's
burgomaster, agreed to execute a plan to eliminate the area's Tutsi
population. The next morning, April 7th, Kajilijeli brought weapons
from the Mukamira military camp and distributed them to the
interahamwe from Nkuli and Mukingo communes. Over the next
two days, these interahamwe eliminated themajority of the Tutsi in
the two communes. Kajilijeli, in regular communication with Nzi-
zorera, thenwent on to expand the interahamwe to 600men drawn
from the civilian population. Hutu civilians, who already distrusted
their Tutsi neighbours, were readily mobilized and followed in-
structions on when and where to attack the remaining Tutsi
throughout the region.
Analytical insights
The contrasting case studies offer some insight into the causal
mechanisms behind several of the correlates of onset identiﬁed in
the quantitative analysis. First, the burgomasters' and prefects'
party afﬁliation mattered because it determined how quickly po-
litical control could be established at the local level. In Taba, a po-
wer struggle arose between the moderate opposition burgomaster
on one side, and local and national level extremists on the other.
The contest was resolved only after the cooptation of theburgomaster through extremist threats. In Mukingo, extremist elite
control was assured because the burgomaster was an MRND
loyalist networked to the centre through his clientelist friendship
with a senior party member. Second, military control mattered
because it ensured the material means to enforce extremist au-
thority and to implement violence. In Mukingo, a military camp
trained the local interahamwe and supplied themwith weapons. In
Taba, the commune police enforced the burgomaster's peace until
the arrival of interahamwe from outside overwhelmed them
numerically. Third, social cohesionmattered because it took time to
divide well-integrated communities and overcome communal
bonds. In Taba, Hutu and Tutsi initially cooperated for several days
following the president's assassination before separating. In
Mukingo, ethnic solidarity was absent because interethnic distrust
was already high following the outbreak of war. The extant divide
facilitated the mobilization of Hutu residents as local interahamwe.
Lastly, contagion mattered because pro-violence individuals could
move across borders to commit and encourage violence in adjacent
communities. In Taba, the contagion effect was weak because the
Nyabarongo river limited such incursions and because neighbour-
ing communes were also anti-violence. In Mukingo, pro-violence
military and militia were present in neighbouring Nkuli
commune and faced no constraint to enter and commit violence
next door.Discussion and conclusion
This paper has presented a theoretical model for conceptual-
izing a locality's vulnerability to violence comprising two con-
structs: extremist elite control and social segregation at the local
level. Neither factor explains why genocides arise. Theymerely help
predict when and where violence may occur within genocide. As it
is a predictive, not causal model, it remains possible that unob-
served factors underlie ethnic segregation and elite control. While
theory informed the selection of these two variables and the
accompanying controls, the possibility of an alternative explana-
tion must be acknowledged.
How generalizable are these ﬁndings? The model requires sys-
tematic analysis of precise micro-data to test fully its external
validity in other contexts. However, preliminary investigation
suggests its applicability elsewhere. In Sudan the ruling party
countered an insurgency in Darfur by recruiting self-identiﬁed Arab
militia to attack non-Arab villages in coordination with regular
security forces. Preliminary evidence suggests the onset of violence
across Darfur's three states and 36 counties was correlated with
intercommunal relations and ruling party control, consistent with
the theoretical model presented. The counties of North Darfur
experienced the most concentrated violence when the rebellion
ﬁrst began in 2003 (US Government, 2011). The state was the site of
longstanding communal competition over land use between non-
Arab farmers (primarily the Zaghawa) and land-poor Arab camel-
herders (the Abbala tribes). The ruling elite in Khartoum used
these tensions to establish informal connections with the Arab
tribal leadership, including the head of the inﬂuential Mahamid
clan, and thereby recruited an Arab militia to assert military control
in the state (Flint& DeWaal, 2008). The ruling elite also established
political control by using their formal power of appointment to
replace the moderate state governor with a loyal party bigwig in
2003. In contrast in South Darfur, competition over land was
minimal and the land-secure Arab Baggara tribes consequently
maintained historically good relations with their ‘African’ Fur
neighbours. The prominent Madibu clan of the Arab Rizeigat tribe
for instance remained neutral during the war. Cross-ethnic coop-
eration extended to some southern Arab groups even collaborating
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Evidence from Bosnia is also suggestive. Ethnic Serbs, Croats, and
Bosniaks competed for control of the territory's 109 municipalities,
initially through multiparty elections in November 1990 and then
through war between March 1992 and December 1995. A non-
systematic examination of the most serious episodes of violence
against civilians suggests their timing and location were linked to
municipal control (Research and Documentation Center, 2007). For
example, Prijedor municipality, through a bloodless political take-
over, and Foca and Visegrad municipalities, through military
conquest, fell to Bosnian Serb control in spring 1992. Each munici-
pality was the site of well-known mass killings that also began in
spring 1992. In contrast, the genocidal massacre in Srebenica, an
enclave under UN control, did not occur until July 1995 when Serbs
ﬁnally re-captured the territory. Furthermore, research has shown
that high ethnic polarization, a measure related to social cohesion,
increased the intensity of violence in municipalities located close to
the Serbian borderwhere violence began early on (Weidmann, 2011).
Although their speciﬁc empirical operationalization may vary, the
preliminary analysis suggests then that the theoretical constructs of
elite control and social cohesion may travel to other cases.
The ﬁndings also hold several broader theoretical and policy
implications. Theoretically, the ﬁndings suggest ﬁrst that the ideas
of violence from above and violence from below should be thought
of less as competing and more as complementary explanations
(Weidmann, 2011). Elite agency and social structure operated
together in Rwanda to produce violence. It is important to note,
however, that no communes where extremists were in control and
cohesion was high failed to experience violence. High social cohe-
sion delayed but did not prevent killing. This would suggest struc-
tural forces from below constrain or facilitate elite behaviour from
above, but these forces do not, by themselves, determine violence.
Second, the disaggregated approach has suggested the existence
of dynamic determinants of violence within genocide. Speciﬁcally,
it pointed to the operation of temporal and feedback dynamics. The
passage of time had an independent effect on violence onset. The
violence began quickly, then decelerated, and ﬁnally accelerated.
The complex distributional form time took suggests genocide and
perhaps other aggregated violent phenomena merit further
diachronic analysis. Violence is also highly contagious or, put
differently, violence is endogenous to itself. Feedback dynamics in
violent phenomena such as ethnic warfare have already been
recognized (Kaufman, 2001). This paper, however, reﬁnes this
observation. It ﬁnds (temporally antecedent) violence begets
violence in spatially adjacent areas. This ﬁndingmay account then in
part for two remarkable features of Rwanda's violence: its speed
and geographic ambit. The violence spread in just over 100 days to
almost every commune in the country. In the fourth smallest and
most densely-populated country in Africa, it is unsurprising that
contagion effects from spatial adjacency are likely to be ampliﬁed.
Finally, the ﬁndings have potential policy implications for de-
cision makers at the international level onwhen and where limited
intervention resources could be applied to prevent or stop violence.
In the simplest scenario, peacekeepers could be deployed to regions
most vulnerable to violence. The aim would be to prevent violence
or stop it in earliest stages. However, as in Rwanda, it is possible the
violence is too rapid to prevent its occurrence or the resources too
few to stop determined killers. In this scenario, it may be strate-
gically expedient to target regions less vulnerable to violence
instead. The delay to the violence in these communities would
provide the time needed to deploy peacekeepers preventatively.
Peacekeepers would then face the easier challenge of a peace to
keep rather than a conﬂict to end. The presence of peacekeepers
would also strengthen extant local resistance from moderate elitesand cohesive communities opposed to violence. Together, inter-
national peacekeepers and cooperative local communities could
help turn areas within resistant regions into safe havens for resi-
dent civilians and for refugees from more vulnerable regions. It is
evidently easier to protect several well-delimited areas than an
entire country.
Deciding when and where to deploy intervention resources
raises complex strategic and ethical questions. I have described
only two simple scenarios. In Rwanda, it has been convincingly
argued that relatively few additional lives could have been saved
through external intervention because the true nature and scale of
the violencewere not known at the outset and because the violence
occurred too rapidly to deploy the resources needed to stop it
(Kuperman, 2000). Today, the proliferation of technologies to
disseminate information rapidly and widely means it is unlikely a
knowledge gap would represent as signiﬁcant an impediment to
intervention. However, the arguments concerning the speed of the
violence and the limited intervention resources available remain.
The UN Force Commander on the ground commanded just over
2500 peacekeepers, a number subsequently reduced to 454, to
protect hundreds of thousands of civilians dispersed across over
26,000 km2. This paper suggests nonetheless that something more
could have been done had better information on when and where
violence would break out been available. There existed a window
between 6 and 20 April 1994 in the central and southern pre-
fectures of Gitarama and Butare where peacekeepers could have
been deployed before the violence began to reinforce the resistant
communities there. Their presence may have delayed violence yet
further and possibly have bought enough time to establish a
corridor for civilians to cross Rwanda's southern border into
Burundi. The potential upside was not insigniﬁcant. The two pre-
fectures were home to nearly one third of Rwanda's Tutsi popula-
tion in 1994 and had drawn many more Tutsi from other
prefectures who saw Butare and Gitarama as places of ﬁnal refuge
during the bloodshed. Scepticism regarding humanitarian inter-
vention in Rwanda is well-founded but should be softened.
One outcome of the State Failure Task Force in the 1990s was a
list of countries, a global map, identifying those at greatest risk of
genocide and politicide (Harff, 2003). The challenge for the next
generation of research is perhaps to construct maps showing
‘violence ﬂashpoints’ or potential ‘safe havens’ within these iden-
tiﬁed countries. Armed in advance with this information, interna-
tional decision makers may deploy limited intervention resources
more effectively and more quickly to prevent or to stop killing once
it has begun.
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Endnotes
1 The estimates are for genocides and politicides occurring between 1945 and 2001.
The ﬁgures rise if the broader concepts of democide (Rummel, 1995) and mass
killing events (B. Valentino et al., 2004) are considered.
O.S. McDoom / Political Geography 42 (2014) 34e45 452 Straus' data are missing onset dates for 21 communes for which I used my own
dates obtained through ﬁeldwork in 2009 that drew on information from Rwanda's
community justice process, gacaca.
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